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Professor Zhang, you have come to the Wissenschaftskolleg to study the German model of
federalism, as you did before with the U.S. variety of decentralized government. China has
more than two thousand years of experience in governing a gigantic territory with hundreds
of millions of inhabitants from one unitary center of power. Why is it that after such a long
time the federalist model has suddenly become interesting for China?
I can only say that some Chinese intellectuals have been seriously preoccupied with
federalism, while the government has never accepted the idea. But sometime in the future,
China will adopt a federal constitution and implement federalism since the current system
cannot work. This is why the German federal experience is so important to China.
China’s governance was never without problems, but these have been accentuated in
recent ages because of the social and economic upheavals of our time. The first emperor
Qin Shi Huang, who unified China after the long cruel period of the warring states around
220 BC, established a very simple unitary model of government which is basically still in
place. China was already a huge country back then, although much less populated. It was a
highly centralized model, but it didn’t function very efficiently due to physical limitations.
“The Heaven is high and the Emperor far away,” as we used to say, meaning that the
locals had a fair amount of latitude. As long as things went well the local officials were left
alone; if not and things got so out of hand that the central government became aware, then
they would be punished. As a result we used to have a good deal of local diversity, but only
because the central government was unable to control all the little bits and pieces at the
local level.
So there was never any formalized structure of decision-making outside the center?
The barriers of transportation and communication left room for some diversity and
pluralism, but this was never institutionalized. And it still isn’t today because our
institutional structure basically hasn’t changed much over all these centuries. We still have
a central government with unlimited legislative power. They come up with a command that
will be uniformly implemented across the country whether it fits or not. In China we call that:
“one knife cuts all” (yidaoqie)  – whether you are tall or short, we will just give you the same
size. One example: China has serious pollution problems, so the government has decided
to stop using coal for heating in the winter. They stopped coal supplies and ordered gas use
instead. Now in many places no provisions have been made for winter. Central government
doesn’t really know which localities are prepared and which aren’t. The local authorities
would have known, but all they can do is follow orders from the center in this unitary
system.
This isn’t even about diversity and local self-determination. Not freezing to death in winter is
a universal need. Why wouldn’t the central government allow local authorities the discretion
to provide for that need?
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The problem is not a general lack of de facto discretion. There is plenty of that and in fact
that’s precisely the problem. Local officials commit plenty of violations of law and human
rights. Corruption is obviously a very common and mostly local problem, and the central
government often has neither the information nor the manpower nor the resolve to
eradicate it. In principle the central government makes all the major policy decisions for the
local authorities to implement. But if that policy goes against their personal interest then
they have many ways to circumvent it. Even if the national policy will benefit people, it won’t
be implemented as long as there is no pressure from below. For example the government
occasionally provides for catastrophe relief, every official down the line will “pluck a feather
from the bird,” so there isn’t much left for needy receivers when it finally reaches its
destination.
Is there no possibility for pressure from below? Don’t people file complaints?
Yes, but there are so many violations that the central government just doesn’t know where
to begin. Ever since ancient times we have had a petitioning system. If you have some
grievance, if some local official does something to you, you turn to his superior. But that is
the guy who appointed the inferior official you are complaining about, so he is very
reluctant to solve your problem because that would suggest he made a mistake himself and
appointed the wrong person. So you turn to the superior’s superior, but the same logic
applies, and so forth all the way up the power hierarchy until you wind up in Beijing. The
central government is very nervous because all those petitioners flock into the capital. It’s a
huge ‘siphon’ effect! People line up for miles outside the Central Disciplinary Committee
and with virtually no chance of getting their problem solved. Along the way they will suffer
all sorts of hardships and  mistreatment, sometimes in a much more horrible way than the
original grievance they complained about. In the end it is all in vain. They waste their
money, time, energy. I have seen people who have petitioned for twenty and even thirty
years and it basically consumed their lives. Still, a lot of people keep doing it. This is sort of
our culture. Under such a system, what else can they do?
What about the judiciary? Here in legalistic Germany we put a lot of faith in our judges to
hold the authorities accountable.
It’s the same central/local problem. We have one Supreme Court for the whole country. It
cannot really oversee all the decisions made by local courts. And the local judges depend
on the local authorities. The socialist constitution says that the courts are supposed to be
under “democratic control,” so the local People’s Congress oversees the local judiciary. In
reality, of course, it’s the party that’s in charge of everything – the People’s Congress is just
a “rubber stamp.” The local governments determine the judicial leadership and provide
money and resources for the courts. If a court decides a case against the government,
there are numerous ways for the local government to come after it. The result is a lack of
judicial independence, rampant local protectionism and judicial complicity in corruption.
This is actually one area where more centralization is needed. People go through so much
hardship to petition Beijing, partly because they can’t count on the court to protect their
rights.
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To centralize or decentralize decisions requires categories to distinguish which policies are
decided on one level and which on another – categories as provided by constitutional law.
But I wonder how much difference a constitution, federalist or not, would make as long as
there is one party in place that monopolizes all the power and is organized in a strictly
hierarchical top-down way.
You are right. Law is very much secondary in China, particularly constitutional law. You
have to resolve the political problem before the legal and constitutional problem can be
resolved. All of these problems can be traced back to a lack of democratic political reform.
If people elected their local officials then they would make sure that they are accountable.
We do have elections every five years, but they are meaningless because of manipulation.
It’s not the vote that decides the fate of the officials, it is their superior. So, where the
people cannot vote meaningfully, an official is not made responsible to them but only to his
superior. Under such a system you don’t really have a “central-local” relationship; all you
have is a superior-inferior relationship that exists solely on the personal plane. This has to
change before the central-local relationship can have any meaning.
So the Chinese Communist Party would have to admit competing parties?
Well, yes. If we don’t have an overtly competitive party system, at least there has to be
some genuine competition within the ruling party itself. In this regard we can learn from
Japan and other Asian countries. Asia has perhaps the longest authoritarian tradition in the
world. Even some nominally democratic countries are not really very democratic. So we are
closer to their situation and might learn from their experience. In the 1980s, at the height of
China’s progressive reforms, there was discussion about separating the party and the
state. In 1982-83, when the first election was held after the current constitution was
enacted, there were genuine electoral campaigns. People today still talk about the lively
competitions on the Peking University campus when the opposing candidates debated on
the same platform, one later becoming the current Premier (Li Keqiang) and others
overseas “democracy fighters” (such as Hu Ping and Wang Juntao). But after that the party
leaders seemed to become cautious and they tightened their control. After 1989 we
experienced a huge rollback to the point that elections became completely meaningless.
Is your research perceived by the party officials as a challenge or as being helpful? Might
your critique of your country’s system get you in trouble?
I became very sensitized to this possibility after I published a constitutional manifesto in late
2011 to commemorate the centennial anniversary of the first Chinese republican revolution.
As a public intellectual I used to write many commentaries every year. It has become
almost impossible to get these published in magazines and newspapers in China. The past
four decades witnessed an enormous expansion of free speech in China, particularly since
development of the Internet, but only de facto and not as a constitutionally protected right.
The government can always restrict speech if it wants to, including Internet speech; so far
there has been nothing to stop that. For example they can simply order the Internet
services to cancel your accounts, which is what they did with my blogs and microblogs
(equivalent to Twitter in China) in 2013 during the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress.
They can, of course, also blacklist you from formal publication since virtually all the
publishers, magazines and newspapers are publicly owned in China. There was a rumor
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that I and several liberal authors were once blacklisted. I asked various publishers and got
conflicting answers. Anyway, many publishers are scared and declined to publish my
books, which are totally academic and not politically sensitive. Things get much easier if
you publish in English since they don’t have control over foreign publishers. Nor do they
care since they are mainly concerned about the impact on  Chinese readers. The regime
restricts speech, but that doesn’t necessarily mean they personally dislike or even disagree
with what I say. There are plenty of people within the system who have intense interest in
my research. Take the Hong Kong issue for instance. This is an example of the so-called
unitary system of such a giant country not being so unitary after all. Ever since it was
returned to China by the British government twenty years ago, Hong Kong has enjoyed a
high degree of autonomy based on the schema of “one country, two systems” as
elaboratedin the Basic Law. Only in recent years has the central government tried to extend
its control over Hong Kong. The effect has been paradoxical. Ten years ago the
Hongkongese just wanted autonomy; but now, as a reaction to their lack of autonomy and
deprivation of rights in electing their own government, they are even calling for
independence. You want more control, but what you get is less. So I propose the reverse –
control less and grant more autonomy and you will actually gain more control. In fact what
matters is that China keep its sovereignty over Hong Kong, but this doesn’t mean that the
central government should make it their business to run the city. That should be the
concern of the residents of Hong Kong, who would all be grateful to the central government
for its liberal approach. Officials with decent minds highly praise the ideas which I’m
advocating, but no journal in mainland China would dare to publish them now.
To what extent are federal states like Germany and the U.S., which were historically formed
by independent states that decided to enter upon a union at one point, comparable to
centralized states which face problems of devolution and regional secessionism?
There are many different kinds of federal states, and centralized ones like the UK or France
differ even more. But these differences are minor from our perspective. Devolution in a
unitary system differs from federalism in that it is provided not by the constitution but by
national legislation, which the parliament in principle may revoke at any time. But our
problem is much more fundamental. If we don’t have democracy, devolution is not
necessarily a good thing; it could mean a huge risk of local abuses of power. Since the
local government is not responsible to the local people, if the central government relaxes its
control then things could simply spin out of control. Limited devolution resulted in a huge
catastrophe, namely the Great Famine in the late 1950s and early 1960s as caused by the
Great Leap Forward. It is officially called the “three years of natural disaster,” but it was in
fact an institutionally caused disaster. This was the time when China practiced a rigorous
planned economy and the central government was prescribing a conscription of crops from
the household yield. During that time local governments were given not less but more
control over the economy, whereas the political system was of course rigorously vertical,
the inferior officials dependent on their superiors for promotion, so they were anxious to do
whatever was necessary to please the central government. The crop yield in 1959 was not
as good as in 1958, but the local governments reported such optimistic figures to their
superiors that the central government then fixed unrealistically ambitious quotas. And the
local government was enthusiastic in rigorously executing the central command; they even
tried to exceed the prescribed conscription at the expense of peasants who were forced to
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hand their harvest over to the government without keeping enough for their own
sustenance. As a result, tens of millions died of starvation. That would never have
happened in a democratic system. Amartya Sen says that India, a very poor country, never
suffered a famine of such magnitude because it is a democracy.
When you walk the streets of Berlin, the political center of Germany, does what you see
meet your expectations? Much as I love Berlin, I have to admit that many Germans,
particularly those from older and prouder and richer cities like Munich, Cologne, Frankfurt
or Hamburg, have a rather low opinion of our broke and dysfunctional federal capital.
That is fairly typical for a federal state, isn’t it? The fact that Berlin is not so rich and
privileged indicates that democracy and federalism do work in this country. When you go to
Beijing it’s totally different. At this moment they are trying to kick out all those poor people
who came to Beijing, the so-called “outsiders” or “northern drifts.” That is another way in
which China, on closer examination, is not “unitary” or “socialist” at all. We have all these
man-made barriers against outsiders. There are so many institutional fences everywhere.
And I mean literally. When you want to enter Humboldt-Universität you can just walk right
in, but Peking University is surrounded by a huge fence and you have to show your ID to
get through. We try to make our capital the best, we’ve created all sorts of privileges which
naturally attract people from all over the country, but it’s extremely difficult to get a Beijing
household registration (hukou). In fact a quite famous German visitor rightly called
the hukou a “passport” (huzhao), as if you need special permission to enter a foreign
country and share its many privileges. Just one example – it is much easier for students
with a Beijing hukou to enter the prestigious universities because the majority of these are
in Beijing and they issue quotas to every province, so Beijing residents naturally get a much
higher quota. We even have different examinations for Beijing and half of the provinces,
and the admission standards are highly protective of local residents. This is actually part of
the “stability maintenance” (weiwen) system: We want the Beijing residents to be
reasonably happy and not to protest. They (including my own family) are getting what you
might call a free pass by dint of this unfair and highly centralized system. But as I said at
the beginning, this system is bound to change. China has experienced the First Republic
(1912) and Second Republic (1949) Republic, albeit both pseudo in nature, and at some
point the Third Republic will arrive and it will be a genuine federal democracy like Germany.
This interview was conducted for Wissenschaftskolleg’s “Köpfe und Ideen 2018” and is
reposted here with kind permission. Questions: Maximilian Steinbeis.
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